This paper investigates the appropriateness of formal dialectics as a basis for non-monotonic reasoning and defeasible reasoning that takes computational limits seriously. Rules that can come into con ict should be regarded as policies, which are inputs to deliberative processes. Dialectical protocols are appropriate for such deliberations when resources are bounded and search is serial.
ARGUMENTS AND DEMONSTRATION
Sometimes there is proof; mostly there are arguments. A proof demonstrates its claim once and for all. An argument, in contrast, produces warrant for its claim only when it is e ective, in a context of counterarguments, rebuttal, and further counterargument. It produces warrant as a result of a process which subjects the claim to dispute. 1 This distinction between argument and proof is historically upheld: there is demonstrative reasoning and there is non-demonstrative reasoning.
Mathematical proof is the model of demonstration. Demonstrative reasoning has been the basis of mathematically satisfying formal languages. For non-demonstrative reasoning, formal linguistic systems have been developing more slowly in this century.
Major historical gures have written about this distinction: from Aristotle, who introduced the study of both; to Thomas Aquinas, whose discussions of argument occurred during a time when, reversing current thought, non-demonstrative reasoning dwarfed demonstrative reasoning as a topic of intellection; to the unsuccessful admonitions of John Maynard Keynes against Russell and Whitehead as they were conscripted under Hilbert's reductionist mathematicism; to Karl Popper's attempt to distinguish respectable study of disputation from Hegelian dialectical metaphysics; to Alonzo Church's infamous claim of dialectic's intrinsic incompatibility with formalism. 2 AI's interest in this decade in non-monotonic reasoning forces a return to the non-demonstrative paradigm. Formalists in AI, especially those of the knowledge representation milieux, have not yet acknowledged that their work connects to a longer tradition. Applied AI research in law, discourse, and uncertainty has shown better understanding and better scholarship on this matter.
REASONS AND POLICIES
Reasoning begins not only with claims, but also with reasons. Chaining reasons forms arguments for further claims.
Some take the relation of one claim being reason for another claim to be primitive; others feel that reasons can be derived from other reasons, or warranted by argument, particularly statistical argument.
In the long tradition of logical thought, the reason relation has been thought to have many nuances. This century's logical mainstream departs from the longer intellectual tradition at Russell. He insisted on a narrow formulation of reasons. Reasons were to be treated uniformly as mere (disjunctive) claims. Inductive logicians distinguish themselves by their conviction that all reasons derive from probabilistic considerations. Assimilating reasons as subjunctive conditionals has been popular recently. All three are reductionist programmes that construe reasons too narrowly.
The defeasible reason, as studied principally by John Pollock in the past three decades, is a serious alternative to the narrow and reductionist views of reasons. Where Pollock has focused on the logic of defeasible reasons (1974; 1987; 1992) , the present discussion focuses on the processes in which those reasons participate.
Represented knowledge can include knowledge about how to conduct reasoning about that knowledge. Reasons are that kind of knowledge: a kind of metaknowledge. Representing object-level knowledge has been well-studied. Representing certain transformations of knowledge has also been well-studied, but under the assumption that the only transformations are those that rewrite the object-level knowledge. \Inference rules" de ne, solely as a function of asserted sentences, a set of sentences as theorems, which are the result of transformations. Legitimate transformations are only those \sound" or \truth-preserving" transformations that rewrite the meanings of what is already asserted. The transformations de ne a shorthand system in which sentences are succinct ways of writing all of their entailments. This is true of inductive entailments and non-monotonic entailments, as well as deductive entailments.
A representer who conveys knowledge as \p" and \if p then q" also conveys as knowledge \q", implicitly. This is what is meant by using both sentences \p" and \if p then q" in a propositional language, pc. Both Jon Doyle (1989) and I (1991) have recently written at length about this view of implicit knowledge and its alternatives. Philosophers have called \non-ampliative" all inferences that merely These do not contrapose, do not survive logical strengthening of the referent (the rst of the objects related, the \left-side"), nor weakening of the relatum (the second of the objects related, the \right-side"). Arguments that make use of a policy might allow weakening of that policy's claims (thus, deriving a weaker argument from an argument), but altering the policy itself by weakening the relata (thus, deriving a policy from a policy) violates the spirit of a policy. These policies can also be embedded in a system of rules wherein it strains intuition to admit reasoning by cases, or to create new policies by chaining as if the reason relation were transitive (Loui, 1987(b) ).
MEANING AND PROCESS
Part of the meaning of a policy is the policy-maker's understanding that the policy will be used eristically, that is, in processes of disputation where arguments are based on policies.
That policies can con ict is clear: so clear, that the dialectician's song of \syn-thesis from con icting thesis and antithesis" is banal. More interesting is that disputations based on policy often warrant conclusions because of the particular way in which the disputation occurred. Repeating the disputation under similar conditions is not guaranteed to produce the same outcome. Nevertheless, the conclusion is warranted. Indeed it is odd to say that we accept an outcome even though we would have accepted the opposite, had it occurred as the outcome instead.
This non-determinism 5 is the main di erence between ampliative inference and mere expansion of shorthand. Consequences depend on non-deterministic choices that are input to the process, and on the protocol for the process. The function that maps represented knowledge to constructed inferences not only depends on the entire set of claims, but also must be indexed by a particular process: its individuating features, such as particular non-deterministic choices, and the context of the process, such as resource bounds that were imposed and the regimen distributing those resources.
Another di erence is non-monotonicity in computation: had the process continued, a di erent result might have emerged. Note that this non-monotonicity is not a property of syntax: syntactically non-monotonic systems 6 do not necessarily de ne results for partial computations. It is the non-monotonic dynamics of partial computations that deserves attention: the phenomenon that more computation could cause retraction of conclusions. Mere non-monotonicity of syntax is less interesting.
Inference is constructed through process. Policies do not demonstrate conclusions; they are ingredients to a process that warrants conclusions. In general there is no ideal process, 7 no correct outcome of the process. There is sometimes a natural termination: for instance, when the set of arguments is nite and can be exhausted, or when protocol leads to deadlock. The outcome at a natural point of processtermination (which still may be a non-deterministic outcome) may be desirable. But this is because we prefer processes that terminate at natural points of termination over those that terminate ungraciously. We need not insist on an ideal; not every process computes an approximation of some ideal. We may prefer unbounded computations over bounded ones, but not necessarily because they produce results that are ideal by some independent standard.
Constructing belief non-deterministically is anathema to mathematical logic. The idea, however, has been successful elsewhere. In mathematical statistics, for example, the dominant view is that hypotheses undergo testing. What makes a statistical hypothesis acceptable is the process by which it is conceived and tested, not just the relation it bears to other statistical assertions. The testing could have returned a di erent answer, and we are bound (at least until further hearing) to the outcome no matter what it is. This Neyman-Pearson view has dominated the Bayesian alternative. Data are most important to acceptability, but are not the sole arbiters.
Since Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn, the constructivist view of scienti c theoryformation is mainstream, not the Carnapian view based on theory's probabilistic relation to data. In decision theory, the works of Simon and of Shafer and Tversky use constructivism to address Savage's and von Neumann-Morgenstern's nonconstructivist shortcomings. Heuristic approaches to optimization, including the outputs of connection networks that attempt to minimize energy functions, but settle in local minima, are almost always constructive.
Not all constructions are heuristic. Some properties, especially social properties, are de ned to hold by construction. What makes a deserving Supreme Court Justice is the positive outcome in a con rmation process. What makes political mandate is the fairness of the election. What makes a championship sports team is its prevailing in the playo s. Most footprints in the sand are not the right size and shape, but are caused by feet and subjected to the right erosive processes.
There is nothing odd about having both a constructivist and a constraint-based view of what makes something what it is. What makes a belief rational, in one sense, is the relation it bears to other beliefs. This is a constraint imposed on claims of rationality. But a constructivist conception is also possible. What makes beliefs rational could be the way in which they are constructed: they are the outcomes of the right kind of deliberative process.
The distinction is not merely one of statics versus dynamics. Axiomatic theories of belief-revision and axiomatic theories of time-attitudes toward preference seek to impose constraints on the dynamics of belief, but do not thereby advocate a constructive view. What marks constructivism is the non-determinism (and to a lesser extent, the non-monotonicity) of the construction.
Sometimes it is possible to have both constructive and constraint-based grounds for a claim. For example, at the completion of a Solovay and Strassen (1977) probabilistic primality test, the conclusion has both been vindicated by a test of the right kind and is highly probable given the data. In that case, the propriety of the test has probabilistic origins.
In a trite sense, all beliefs are the result of some metaphysical non-determinism: the world could have di ered from what it was. A rational agent could have come to believe p instead of not-p, by whatever means of belief-formation. Furthermore, this belief is revisable, which is a kind of non-monotonicity. Is this construction? We are interested only in constructions that are based upon a xed set of claims. Even for a xed set of background beliefs, there is disagreement about inference. Constraintbased, non-ampliative, rewriting, demonstrative, Russellian inference gives one answer: only one construction is permissible; while constructivist, ampliative, dewriting, non-demonstrative, Keynesian inference gives another answer: many construc-tions are permissible.
DIALECTIC AND PROTOCOL
The importance of process is widely recognized in many intellectual elds. Computer science has the additional responsibility of specifying the process.
One of the right kinds of process for constructing rational belief is dialectic. Dialectic refers to one form of disputation in which a serializable resource is distributed so that one party's use of that resource is informed by the result of the other party's (or parties') prior use of resource. That is, disputation that is dialectical involves response. The serialized resource is typically either search for arguments or time for presentation of arguments, but could also be the adjudicator's sequential consideration of arguments.
Dialectics can be immediate-response or not. If response is immediate, then satisfaction of some condition, such as the changing of an adjudicator's current opinion, or the mere presentation of an argument, causes a switch in control of resource. Most evolved systems of disputation are dialectical, but not immediate-response.
I doubt that the protocol of disputation must be dialectical in order for the outcome to be rational, constructed belief. Still, dialectical protocols satisfy certain desiderata having to do with e ectiveness and fairness of the process.
Protocols that are one-sided, that permit lobbying, that give all of the resources to one side, are inappropriate. Policies con ict and lead to con icting arguments. Producing arguments for one side of a dispute is too easy when reasons abound. Goal-directed search for arguments must admit search-targets from both sides.
Consider the example of negation-as-failure in logic programming or default reasoning, where search for counterargument is restricted to demonstrative counterargument. Suppose two default rules (as in Reiter 1980): This is a bit unfair as a portrayal of resource-bounded default reasoning. The form of the default rule requires resource-exhaustion in order to advance an argument. The attempt to prove not-B is an invitation for counterargument, which has dialectical leanings. The problem is that the counterargument must be demonstrative. Surely a better implementation awaits the clever deployer of resource-bounded defaults. Still, the negation-as-failure example illustrates how non-monotonic reasoning, in its early forms, ignores dialectical ideas, resource distribution, and the consideration of fairness under resource-bounded construction that lead to dialectical ideas.
An even more extreme example of lobbying protocol starts with the latter pair of defeasible rules. The argument for B is advanced. Then search continues to target the construction of arguments for B until resources are exhausted. The results of deliberation based on such a protocol are clearly unacceptable. The fairer the protocol of a disputation, and the better the strategic play, and the more e ective the expenditure of resource, the better warranted the outcome. Dialectic ensures two properties that bear on fairness and e ectiveness:
1. when one side is losing, it gets resources; this is fair in at least one sense. And 2. when an opinion results, maximum resources were spent attempting criticism, and failing; this is e ective.
Nicholas Rescher (whose monograph is the most sensible disquisition to date on the subject) justi ed dialectic by claiming that knowledge is social; hence, the formation of knowledge must meet social standards.
The root issue in probative rationality is that of \building up a good case" to enlist the conviction of one's fellows. Accordingly, probative standards are person-indi erent; they are inherently public and communal. : : : The very conception of duly validated knowledge claims relates to publicly established and interpersonally operative standards. p. 60] A di erent justi cation is possible, by referring to fairness, e ectiveness, and the need to adjudicate resource-bounded disputes. Fairness demands maximal opportunity for response, and e ectiveness demands maximal information about what are the aims of response. Fair protocol and e ective advocacy are required of a dispute for rational believers to accede to a process's outcome.
When resources are unbounded and arguments exhaustible (which is impossible if arguments are in nite), or when search is completely parallelizable and strategies for adjudication can cope with unserialized argumentation, then perhaps dialectic is unnecessary even in disputational deliberations. There are other criteria of fairness, such as equivalent expenditure of resource, which then dominate the selection of protocol. 
EXISTING WORK
Work related to the logic of disputation is considerable, though most of it is not widely known, even among philosophical logicians. In AI there are also a few precedents. Literatures of rhetoric, legal philosophy, and debate are all relevant, but nor formal in a useful way.
The diagram of Stephen Toulmin (1958) is currently popular among those who must pictorially represent non-demonstrative arguments (e.g., Marshall et al. 1991 ). Toulmin's form for an argument has four parts: claim, warrant (the non-demonstrative reason which allows the claim), datum (the evidence needed to use the reason), and backing (the grounds for the reason). In AI's Tweety example, the claim is that Tweety ies, the warrant is that birds y, the datum is that Tweety is a bird, and the backing is some statement of the grounds for the non-demonstrative reason: presumably some statistical claim about ying's frequency among birds. Counterargument can attack any of these elements. Toulmin diagrams can be chained for visual e ect and are currently investigated mainly for user-interface applications (Marshall et al. 1991) and ). Toulmin's essay is of historical interest and suggests that the proper formalism will be found in modal deontic logic, which was fashionable at the time.
A problem with Toulmin's essay is that little guidance is given regarding the distinction between datum and backing. Readers of non-monotonicity's literature know data to be nodes and warrants to be links; backings, then, are the equally mysterious justi cations for links. As a form in which to present arguments pictorially, Toulmin form is minimalist: macro forms that are structured collections of Toulmin schemata could be de ned for particular styles of non-demonstrative argument, such as analogy, inference to the best explanation, decision under risk, and so forth, which would perhaps be more cogent.
Lorenz \strip" diagrams were invented in a contemporaneous German dissertation (1961) . These diagrams consist of a two-column table with one column labeled \proponent" and the other labeled \opponent," though the labels \attacker" and \defender" are also used. Play alternates between the two sides, and the symbols that can be written as legitimate responses are regulated by rules that provide little choice. Winning positions are formally de ned. The e ect of attacks, responses, and winning is essentially the building of a partial semantic tableaux, or the traversal of one path in a refutation tree. The rules for responses are basically rules for a game that would determine whether a sentence is a tautology, except that the underlying logic is intuitionist.
A large body of work follows Paul Lorenzen and Jaakko Hintikka's use of Lorenz strip diagrams for game-theoretic semantics, noting that they are especially wellsuited for intuitionist logic (see Krabbe 1985 for example). Lorenz however demonstrates a broader conception of this diagram's use when he suggests in a later paper (1973) that the dialogue game could be limited to a nite number of attacks, or a nite number of plays, thus anticipating resource bounds. A large literature also surrounds Jim MacKenzie's augmentation of Lorenz games to include locutions from Charles Hamblin's theory of dialogues (see Walton 1985 for a review). The main additions are the use of interrogatives (hence, its a nities to erotetic logic) and the concept of information-store or commitments. Systems in this paradigm have developed quite formally. MacKenzie (1990) and Walton (1989) are examples. Hamblin's system purports to model exchanges of information through dialogue. MacKenzie's systems appear to revive medieval styles of dialectical reasoning: a player might adopt inconsistent or unwarranted commitments, especially because of limited inferential capacity, and interrogation seeks to put the set of commitments in order. Walton's games are particularly suited to modeling informal fallacious reasoning, such as question-begging or ad hominem arguments. All of these systems are interesting inasmuch as they are formalizations of two-player protocols over formal logical languages.
MacKenzie's system is the closest in spirit to the present work. The medieval \obligation games" sought to land opponents in contradiction mainly by asking questions. Commitments are added to a player's store because the player must answer the questions. When an inconsistency arises, the player may be asked to resolve the inconsistency by withdrawing an earlier commitment. Certain logical forms and inferences cannot be withdrawn. The games rely on restricted forms of implication and consistency, each quali ed by the adjective \immediate." The underlying logic of immediate implication need not include anything more than modus ponens. Logics of dialogue do not however employ non-demonstrative reasons. When inconsistency arises, a player may retreat by withdrawing claims or conditionals. The missing option is that a player might retain all claims and conditionals and resolve prima facie inconsistency by considering some (chains of) conditionals to be defeated. Argument systems arising from inheritance and non-monotonic systems also take claims and conditionals to be largely shared among players, which logics of dialogue do not. Still, the relationship between logics of dialogue and what AI is attempting in non-demonstrative reasoning has many facets deserving further attention. 9 Investigations of logics of dialogue demonstrate considerable scholarship in pre-Fregean logical history. There is quite a bit of polemical writing in the work on dialogue logics against the direction of logic in this century. Their polemics could equally be applied here, in making room for formal non-demonstrative reasoning.
By far, the most relevant work is the monograph of Nicholas Rescher (1977) , which follows the monograph on plausible reasoning (1976) . The later work has more focus and formalism, but has been heretofore largely neglected compared to the earlier work.
The formal system that Rescher develops begs many questions. But it is undoubtedly the most elegant system to date; his essay has a clarity and purposiveness that could make it last for centuries. His discussion is complete. Although he dedicates the essay to famous dialecticians, it is the book that every dialectician wishes he had written.
Rescher says he seeks: Rescher's system augments Lorenz strip diagrams mainly by adding non-demonstrative reasons and informally discussing termination based on plausibility.
I have found no further development of Rescher (though it is occasionally referenced). The dialogical logic community could make no sense of reasons which relate sentences and the sentences for which they are reasons. Walton's dissertation recoiled at \provisoed assertion" (Rescher's name for the defeasible reason), since (paraphrasing Walton 1984) it is not transitive, it does not detach, its re exivity and symmetry properties are unknown, and not everything follows from inconsistency. Rescher intimates that it is supposed to be read \P generally (or usually or ordinarily) obtains provided that Q," or \P obtains, other things being equal, when Q does," or \Q constitutes prima facie evidence for P." It is not a matter of probabilities, but a matter of how things go normally or as a rule. Rescher here presages the later readings of default rules in AI's e ort to understand non-demonstrative reasons.
Walton complains, One might wonder: with all these properties the slash 10 doesn't have, what properties does it have? The fact that no substantive answer is given indicates at least that the slash is something of a stranger on the logical scene. Perhaps that is why Rescher \for simplicity" supposes that in a formal disputation, moves of the form P/Q are always \correct," i.e., beyond dispute or challenge.
This supposition is bound to be unsettling, not least to logicians. p. 102]
Rainer Hegselmann has similar frustrations:
Rescher has executed an abandonment of logical laws in dialectics that needs clari cation. So it should be, for example, that ex-falso-quodlibet must be abandoned, since it might be reasonable to accept P=Q and Q and :P=QR and Q^R, without thus accepting anything at all. What follows from the abandonment of ex-falso-quodlibet, tertium non-datur, the law of doublenegation, and the law of non-contradiction (he should be obliged to abandon these last three laws as well) cannot be judged in detail, because Rescher did not characterize the resulting \dialectical logic" beyond the stated nonvalidity of the aforementioned theorems. 11
But an unanalyzed relation (such as the non-demonstrative reason) the behavior of which is characterized by the role it plays in a system of reasoning, is perfectly familiar to AI. Rescher himself gives \birds y" as an example of \linkage that gives rise to provisoed assertion." Rescher says these assertions are ceteris paribus rules, \reasonably safe presumption rather than an airtight guarantee." p. 7] \It is sensible to suppose that P once Q is given." Rescher even notes the ampliative character of resource-bounded non-demonstrative reasoning, compared to non-ampliative expansions of shorthands:
If the only evidential move available were logical entailment, rather than this weaker, essentially ampliative stroke-relationship, then the very reason for being of disputation would be undermined. For in a strictly deductive argument, the conclusion cannot be epistemically weaker than its weakest premiss. This would preclude any prospect of building up a case for an epistemically frail conclusion from relatively rm premisses (just as in inductive reasoning), and exactly this is one of the key aims of disputation. p. 7]
Rescher was aware of the emerging popularity of defeasible reasons in epistemology, citing Chisholm (and apparently knowing of Pollock: p. 34 and p. 93 of Rescher), and could have appealed to their work to justify provisoed assertion. However, he takes the existence of non-demonstrative reasons to be unproblematic. He appears not to have been aware of the emerging popularity of non-demonstrative reasons for representing knowledge in AI rule-based and inheritance systems , Reiter 1980 .
Technical aspects of Rescher's system are interesting: non-monotonicity, search, termination, and even defeat by speci city all appear prominently in the text without special concern for their novelty in formal reasoning systems.
Rescher's system has technical limitations from AI's current stance on resourcebounded protocols for non-demonstrative reasoning. Mainly, Rescher's protocol allows only a single reason to be given at each stage, together with a commitment 11 \Kl arungsbed urftig sind Reschers Ausf uhrungen uber in der Dialektik aufzugebende logische Gesetze. So soll z.b. das ex-falso-quodlibet aufgegeben werden m u en, weil es durchaus m oglich und vern unftig sein k onne, zugleich P=Q und Q und :P=Q^R und Q^R zu akzeptieren, ohne deshalb beliebigs zu akzeptieren.
Welche Folgen sich aus der Aufgabe des ex-falso-quodlibet, des tertium-non-datur, des Gesetzes der doppelten Negation und des Nicht-Widerspruchs (auch diese letzten drei Gesetze sollen aufgegeben werden m u en) ingesamt ergeben, l a t sich nicht im einselnen beurteilen, weil Rescher die sich dann ergebende \dialectical logic" uber die behauptete Nichtg ultigkeit der genannte Theoreme hinaus nicht charakterisiert." pp. [42] [43] to the reason's antecedent. Thus, arguments at any point are not grounded in evidence, and in fact there is no shared basis of evidence. Furthermore, Rescher's speci city compares only the logical strength of reasons' antecedents (as in Nute's ldr 1988), rather than comparing whole lines of argument. So something like a directness defeater, a shortcutting of a chain of defeasible rules, which is present in most argument systems evolving from inheritance or non-monotonic reasoning, is unavailable to Rescher. Rescher, nally, has little to say about termination, which he regards as externally informed by measures of plausibility on claims; and Rescher has no formal role for an adjudicator who intervenes or contributes to the dialogue.
Herbert Simon forebode the procedural theme of this paper. Simon's articulation of the distinction between substantive and procedural rationality was e ective and celebrated; his analogy to chess-playing heuristics was apt. However, Simon's examples are limited to economic rationality (decision-making) despite his broad intentions. The remarks here, in contrast, aim squarely at logic. Also, Simon insists on conceiving of an optimum against which satis cing is de ned. He insists on an objective world interpreted by a non-ideal mathematical model that is an unfortunate but computationally necessary approximation. Perhaps this is because of the audience for which he was writing. Still, he falls short of the claim that some things are de ned solely by process, where there need be no reference to an ideal. Says Simon (all quotations are from 1982):
Behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation. Its procedural rationality depends on the process that generated it. p. 426]
The shift from theories of substantive rationality to theories of procedural rationality requires a basic shift in scienti c style, from an emphasis on deductive reasoning within a tight system of axioms to an emphasis on detailed empirical exploration of complex algorithms of thought. p. 442] : : : Economics has largely been preoccupied with the results of rational choice rather than the process of choice. Yet as economic analysis acquires a broader concern with the dynamics of choice under uncertainty, it will become more and more essential to consider choice processes. In the past twenty years, there have been important advances in our understanding of procedural rationality, particularly as a result of research in arti cial intelligence : : :. p. 446] Procedural rationality takes on importance : : : in those situations where thè real world' out there cannot be equated with the world as perceived and calculated by the economic agent. Procedural rationality is the rationality of a person for whom computation is the scarce resource : : :. p. 470] I believe that formalism for non-demonstrative argument, especially non-demonstrative argument about decision-making under risk, is the right development for those who take seriously Simon's ambitions. In fact, there is an established tradition of dialectic in decision theory (Mitro and Mason 1982, Sabre 1991) , following Churchman (1971) . The models of dialectic have not been as logico-linguistic as they are here, so there is room for new work in this direction (Loui 1991(b) ).
Pollock's defeasible reasoning is essentially disputational because reasons can con ict. His impressive tenacity and technical developments have not attended much to the contrast between procedural and substantive rationality. In part, this must be because there was plenty to say about how reasons rebut and undercut each other. Pollock's framework and non-technical comments make room for process: defeasible reasons make more sense as inputs to a constructive process than as a stylistic representation of non-constructive commitment. Pollock (1992) considers arbitrary bounds on some of his speci cations: particularly, on the determination of ultimate warrant, as might arise from limited computation. But Pollock, too, does not pursue rami cations of computational bounds; he does not study the e ects of protocol on the construction of belief. Pollock writes about`recursively enumerable' warrant, but does not make the same claims made here. He is interested in correctness at the limit, and in probabilistic guarantees that interrupted' computations will give the same answer as the limit computation. In fact, Pollock does not necessarily view defeasible reasons as policies for constructing belief under resource bounds. He appears unwilling to commit himself to a procedural view. This lack of will is probably due to a desire for defeasible reasoning to nd as broad an audience as possible, not due to a lack of perception. Pollock's record of work in conditional logics gives him a stake in substantive approaches. His history of leadership in epistemology asks that he see defeasibility arising from further experience as well as from further computation.
In AI, Doyle (1989) has been making about representation and belief many of the same claims made here. Among them, Doyle agrees that belief is constructed from \manifest representation," and that sometimes choice is involved.
Doyle also sees belief construction as \an activity, one step in the more general process of reasoning in time." However, he sees the choice as a matter of preference, to be attacked as a problem in decision theory. If this choice is prescribed by the meanings of epistemic utilities (a la Levi 1980) or ordered preferences (a la Wellman-Doyle 1991), then Doyle and I disagree over the ampliative nature of belief construction. This is because a represented preference would force a particular belief to be constructed solely in virtue of the meanings of the preferences applied to the meanings of preference sentences. There would not necessarily be non-determinism nor necessarily non-monotonicity in computation. However, Doyle is attuned to the tradition of constructivism in decision theory (especially the writings of March 1986 and Simon 1982) , so the disagreement may be merely a matter of emphasis.
More interesting are passages of Doyle's doctoral dissertation (1980) , which Doyle himself later describes as being about \controlling action through dialectical deliberation." 12 (1991) This dissertation was not well-received, as evidenced by its lack of citation. My conclusion is that Doyle's \Truth/Reason Maintenance System" was misunderstood for a decade. Legitimate developments of the TMS as a system of dialectic, including Doyle's thesis, went unappreciated. The Fregean grip on the non-monotonic reasoning community is to be blamed. The remaining AI work exhibits less conviction than Doyle's. The step-logic of Elgot-Drapkin, Miller, and Perlis (1991) is vaguely related to the present paper because it views reasoning as a process through time that is not deterministic and non monotonic. But in their systems, when reasons fail to demonstrate, the non-demonstrative behavior is epiphenomenal, not fundamental. Loui (1987(a) ) considers justi cation with respect to a restricted set of arguments, but does not consider dialectic explicitly. Baker and Ginsberg's report on computing prioritized circumscription (1989) is essentially an example of the kind of disputational process discussed here. The authors, however, did not agree on the import of the dialectical process, venturing only to suggest that it was a useful strategy of implementation. These authors subordinate the dialectical aspects of their investigation to the a nities it has to circumscriptive and default approaches to non-monotonic reasoning. Similar implementational studies that employ dialectical protocols in automated argument systems can be found in Simari- and in Loui et al. (1993) . Both begin with no dialectical aims and are forced to de ne dialectical search processes.
There is a newly proposed system of Vreeswijk (1991) which begins by adopting exactly the position taken here. Unfortunately, Vreeswijk takes as desideratum an equivalence theorem which equates declarative and procedural approaches. This guarantees the work's reception in the existing non-monotonic reasoning community, but evades the important philosophical point.
As mentioned earlier, there is work in AI on non-demonstrative argument and process in the communities of natural language, education, and legal reasoning that is less formal. The recent symposium on argument and belief (see Alvarado 1991) abstracts much of the relevant work. Alvarado (1990) and Cavalli-Sforza-Moore (1992) are excellent examples of the semi-formal analysis of argument that can be found in these AI communities.
NON-MONOTONIC REASONING AND OTHER DISPUTATIONS

Elements
Disputations can have multiple parties. Mostly they have two parties, pro and con. Sometimes there is a non-trivial adjudicator role. When a distinction is desired, some parties are advocates, and some are not. Advocates incline to certain claims that are in dispute. There must be at least two advocates for there to be a dispute. Parties that have strategic roles, roles that include choice, are players.
We are mostly interested in two-advocate disputations with and without adjudicators as parties or players. What distinguishes adjudicators as parties versus adjudication that is a syntactic feature of the system is that an adjudicator, as a party, can engage in dialogue. What distinguishes adjudicator players from parties that are non-players is that their dialogue moves involve choice.
Parties can cooperate about various things. Mostly, they are cooperative about reaching a deeply reasoned opinion (which avoids, for example, libustering) but non-cooperative (adversarial) about what that opinion should be. The interaction of these attitudes complicates strategy.
As Doyle notes, a society of minds or social choice problem is a multi-party dispute, and adopting a position on a dispute is like exhibiting a preference (1989). But we are interested in disputes where social choice is based primarily on the reasons given for preferences rather than the relative social standing of the parties. Though social properties such as authority and privilege do gure in the conduct and result of disputation, the emphasis here on the production of reasons separates this investigation from work on social choice.
Sometimes a single agent acts so as to provide both parties to a dispute. Rescher calls these \unilateral dialectics," which is surely a non-sequitur. What is more interesting is the degree of shared basis and shared resource between the parties. An executive committee can have many individuals, but be so regulated that resources are shared among advocates and agreement is substantial over what claims are foundational and what reasons are recognized. Meanwhile, a single person, even with no mental disorder, might be capable of providing each party to the dispute and be able to partition resources. A single person also might have su cient skepticism that all claims and reasons can be challenged and subject to dispute.
In non-monotonic reasoning, or argument systems that have been proposed for non-monotonic reasoning, the two parties share both foundational evidence and reasons as a basis. In Toulmin, reasons can be disputed as well as claims. In Rescher, all claims can be disputed, but reasons cannot. Some claims must be shared, however, or else a result of disputation can never be reached, according to Rescher. Another way of saying this is that rules for termination often depend on reaching claims that are shared. Note that sharing in this sense has to do with the right or willingness to dispute, not with the freedom of one advocate to use what may be used by another. Considerations of fairness are what allow equal access to a single corpus of undisputed evidential claims and reasons.
In non-monotonic reasoning, the critical resource is time for search and the right to select or schedule targets for goal-directed search. In legal and policy forums, the critical resource is time for presentation of arguments. Communication of arguments in non-monotonic automated reasoners is trivial, once arguments have been constructed: argument presentation may require no more than setting a pointer. Consequently, the protocols and rules for adjudicating automated reasoning disputes may di er markedly from existing social rules for adjudicating policy disputes.
Most signi cant is the availability of lookahead for arguments and its e ect of player strategy. When players can perform private search (where other players are not automatically informed of results of search), there can be lookahead. Particular moves have greater signi cance to termination and adjudication when there is lookahead than when strategy is uninformed. Players can be exhorted to advance their best arguments when time is limited. This is impossible if arguments are advanced immediately when discovered. When the rst admissible argument that is found by search is automatically adopted as the player's move, as would naturally be the case in an immediate-response implementation of non-monotonic reasoning, arguments are not necessarily presented best-rst: the strength of the rst argument cannot be taken to indicate the strength of the ensemble of arguments for the claim.
Protocol
In non-monotonic reasoning, protocol is not formally studied because resource bounds are not taken seriously. Search strategy matters only when resources do not su ce to exhaust the arguments. AI has considered search strategy to be a detail of implementation.
Arguments, however, are likely to be in nite. Arguments proliferate because of syntactic variation. Even if there is a canonical form, which bars multiplicity due to syntactic variation, arguments can be inexhaustible. Rule-bases upon which arguments can be constructed only by chaining rules are the exception, not the norm. Classes of decision-theoretic argument (where trees can be extended inde nitely) and best-explanation argument (where more candidate explanations or theories always can be put forth) are especially likely to be in nite. Analogical argument and statistical argument can usually be produced in combinatorial numbers. All argument can potentially ascend to unbounded meta-levels, although the requisite meta-knowledge and meta-language is likely to be sparse.
More importantly, even a nite set of arguments may not be exhausted by search. This is of special concern when connections between arguments can involve nonrecursive or just plain impracticable computations, such as determining logical entailment or consistency.
Reorientation in the knowledge representation community is needed to include the formal study of protocol as a part of the study of non-monotonic reasoning. Policies produce warrant only through a process of disputation. It is inappropriate to study the forms of policy assertion without also studying the processes in which they will be involved. Policies without processes have no meaning. It does not help to study their transformational behavior or the mathematical structure of their presumably compositional form. For policies, protocol is semantics.
Protocol has two parts: locution and control of locution. Termination, an aspect of controlling locution, is treated separately due to its importance.
In non-monotonic reasoning, the appropriate locutions are declarative. Logics of dialogue use a broader class of speech acts, and there may well be good use for simple requests and queries; these could for instance support strategic aims regarding adjudication, control, and termination, such as calling blu s and focusing dispute. However, the full repertoire of rhetorical maneuvers used for persuasion is beyond the present scope; much of what has been studied as persuasive dialogue detracts from the idea that dispute is a model of rational inquiry.
Locutions pertain not only to the substance of the dispute, but also to the pro-tocol. Arguments can advance claims about how to de ne or alter the protocol. Arguments can seek to establish conditions relevant to protocol, such as defeat relations among arguments, adequacy of responses, and termination. These are rightly considered meta-arguments. The more e ective the de nitions of aspects of protocol, such as when an argument defeats another, when response is adequate, and when termination is appropriate, the less the need to ascend to meta-argument. Frequently, agreement over protocol is a part of shared basis. An important distinction between Rescher's protocol and search protocols that implement argument systems in AI is that locutions in Rescher are one-step arguments. Rescher presumes no evidential basis in which to ground arguments, so argument chains could extend arbitrarily. Rescher preempts arbitrary-length locutions by simply restricting a locution to a single claim and (possibly) a single reason.
Refer to restrictions on the locutions that are legitimate moves as locution restrictions, and refer to minimal requirements as locution obligations. Locution restrictions help de ne control of the process, which usually means control of resources. Restrictions prevent unbridled consumption of resource. Locution obligations are helpful in de ning termination; unmet obligations cause a dispute to be lost. Note that there may be no obligation at some points in a disputation, but for the process to be dialectical, there must at some point be an obligation.
Protocol assigns burdens to parties. Rescher identi es burden that arises from \presumption," an inclination of opinion toward one advocate or another. If the presumption is pro, then the burden-to-advance-argument is on con. Presumption occurs throughout non-monotonic reasoning when failure is taken to be negation.
Additional burdens can be assigned. There can be a burden-to-respond-with-defeat. A lesser burden is the burden-torespond-with-interference. Each de nes a locution-obligation. Lack of either burden allows subsequent locution that does not directly respond to the other advocate's argument. Reinstatement potentially occurs when the defeater of an argument is in turn attacked. The burden-to-reinstate-with-defeat, as opposed to reinstating simply with new interference, gives rise to an ambiguity-propagating system. 13 Without the burden, the system is ambiguity-blocking. This burden can be assigned to one side and not the other. In general, assignment of burdens may be not symmetric.
Burden can be assigned regarding most aspects of protocol. There could be a burden-to-argue-for-termination, a burden-to-argue-defeat, or more generally, a burden-to-argue-su ciency-of-response. These burdens make sense when their conditions are not syntactically determined trivially; it makes no sense to assign a burden to argue for termination if determining termination conditions is syntactic and immediate. Such burdens usually do not shift during a dispute nor di er between pro and con.
Pragmatics de nes which burdens are assinged. A dispute in which one side carries heavy burdens compared to the other may be desirable from a strategic point of view. It might be contracted in advance that if the unburdened advocate cannot win such a dispute, then the adjudicator should nd in the opponent's favor.
Termination
AI is familiar with issues of termination because similar issues arise in heuristic search. However, unlike heuristics, critical appraisal of termination rules for disputes sometimes cannot refer to a correct answer. The process itself determines what is the \correct" application of policies and \correct" adjudication of con icts among policies. Some protocols for processes are acceptable and others are not, but not directly because of the prospect or probability of arriving at some right outcome. Protocols may satisfy desiderata that refer to outcome: if there is at least one nal state in which all arguments have been advanced, and in all such nal states, a certain opinion is mandated, then we may aspire to nd a protocol that gives game-theoretic or weak probabilistic assurances of reaching that opinion with earlier termination. We can do no better in appraising protocols in general.
Sometimes disputation just ends; termination befalls. Sometimes the allocation of time is known in advance; time's expiration is scheduled; time for dispute expires. Sometimes disputation is terminated because a condition arises, other than expenditure of resource, such as a winning position. Scheduled time suggests that there will be stages of a disputation. Such staging of dispute is incompatible with immediateresponse dialectic. Protocols for actual debates even restrict the kinds of arguments that can be advanced in each stage. All three kinds of termination (befalling, expiry, and satisfaction of non-resource conditions) are relevant to non-monotonic reasoning.
A state of the disputation can be described in various ways. The current opinion, favoring an advocate or favoring none, is the most succinct description. A more detailed description is formed by the list of undefeated arguments, together with the kinds of responses to each that would su ce to change opinion. A record of stakes that have been won and lost during previous moves, a score, can be kept. Finally, there are more detailed levels of description that refer to the actual sequence and content of argumentation. Fixing exact language for describing state is crucial for managing disputations. It is a prerequisite to negotiation over protocol, or metaargument about adjudication and termination.
Current opinion may be visible to players or hidden during disputation. When dialectic is immediate-response, opinion must be visible; what makes a response adequate and forces a change in control, after all, is an argument's changing current opinion. In non-monotonic reasoning, opinion should be visible, except when computation of opinion is expensive.
Adjudicators can be aggressive. They can intervene to set conditions for termination or focus a dispute. One way to intervene is to declare deadlock on a hopelessly contentious issue and require that advocates substantiate their claims without reliance on the issue being settled. Another intervention is to declare that termination is imminent and to create burdens for one player or for both players which must be satis ed in order to prevent termination or to change opinion. Adjudicator intervention is most useful when dialectic seems not to be moving forward, or when players' interests as advocates of an opinion unduly outweigh the common interest in deep and e ective reasoning.
Part of the shared basis includes agreement over what is a winning position. In Rescher, winning positions are de ned by the plausibility of unargued claims, and plausibility is a metric supplied independently. In non-monotonic reasoning, a winning position is implicit in the rules for defeat among arguments. Whether a position is winning for an advocate can be argued, especially by analogy to canonical disputations.
Strategy
In current approaches to non-monotonic reasoning, there is no strategy because without independent means for evaluating the contentiousness of claims, with no lookahead and no rating the prospect of goal-directed search's success, choices are blind.
There is a place for strategy. When choices are informed, the play of players can be improved by strategy. Improvement of choice is not easily de ned, but information about choice carries game-theoretic implications. For instance, if points of counterargument are ordered by prospect of successful counterargument, and resources are limited, the dominating strategy is to target the point of counterargument with greatest prospect of success, all other things being equal. When the play of each advocate can be bettered, it can result in a process, the results of which are more widely accepted. When asked to accept the result of a deliberative process, an agent is better justi ed in believing the result of a process in which moves are well-played, as long as the disparity in quality of play among players is not too great. A manager forming belief based on disputes among assistants, as well as an audience watching debate, is more justi ed in believing the pronouncement resulting from a well-played competition. If information can be brought to bear on choices, then strategy is a legitimate part of disputations that support rational inquiry.
Termination can be based on a score-keeping which counts the number of ine ective counterarguments, the number o unproductive searches, the number of challenges met, and so on. When there is no strategic play, termination based on score is essentially termination due to a resource bound. When there is strategic play, scores are attributable not only to the inherent strength of an advocate's position, but also to the quality of play.
Thus, policy-makers make policy with the understanding that their policies' application will be holistic, heuristic, non-deterministic, and sometimes even in uenced by strategy and tactics.
SKELETAL MODEL
De nitions
A locution record is a nite sequence ? = < l 1 ; : : :; l k > of locutions where each locution l i is 3-tuple < p i ; s i ; r i >; each p i is a party, from a set P of parties (some of which are players); each s i is either a well-formed sentence in a language L, 14 or is a structure meeting some well-formedness conditions, such as being an argument for a sentence in L; and where r i is a description of resources, such as a d-vector, a marker of resources consumed, of d di erent resource types.
A locution record induces a record of moves, M = < m 1 ; : : :; m k >, a sequence, each element of which is itself a sequence of consecutive locutions by a single player in ?.
< l u ; l v > are adjacent in any m i i p u = p v ); and < l u ; l v > are adjacent in ? i they are adjacent within some m 2 M, or for some < m s ; m t > 2 M, l u is the last locution of m s and l v is the rst locution of m t .
A disputation record, D, is a structure from which a locution record and a record of moves can be derived, ?(D) and M(D).
Example. For a resource-bounded defeasible reasoner, such as the one described in Simari-Loui (1992), P = fpro, cong and p i switches every other locution: moves are 2-tuples.
A move m i is always a well-formed formula of L paired with an argument from the set of arguments constructible from evidence K (a subset of L) and defeasible reasons (a subset of L L), K; . Within a move, the locutions l i and l i+1 are claim and an argument for the claim.
K; is a part of the shared basis; they do not argue over whether sentences or structures are well-formed.
In the implementation described in Loui et al. (1993) , d = 2, so for all i, r i 2 < <, because only two resources a ect protocol: the number of resolvents and the number of attempted resolution steps.
Since sentences are complex (an argument is itself a 2-tuple, whose rst element is the main claim of the argument and whose second element is the set of reasons used to derive the claim from K), we prefer to depict locution records as numbered sequences. The locution record for a familiar dispute is cogently rendered: move locution party sentence resource m 1 l 1 pro ies(opus) <0, 0> m 1 l 2 pro < ies(opus);< bird(opus); ies(opus) > > <2, 30> m 2 l 3 con : ies(opus) <2, 30> m 2 l 4 con < : ies(opus);< penguin(opus);: ies(opus) > > <6, 50> and might be the two-move result of disputing flies(opus) in which 6 resolvent clauses were created in the search for argument that attempted 50 resolutions.
Example. In a Rescher dispute, again P = fpro, cong, where moves are either (a) simple claims, or (b) 2-tuples: a claim in L and a reason for the claim, a member of L L.
Rescher distinguishes between sentences pro and con: L is actually a modal propositional language, with the two operators \!" and \y", for categorical and cautious assertion, respectively. However, since all and only pro's assertions are categorical, and all and only con's assertions are cautious, the distinction is super uous.
Adjudication may be sensitive to the modality of the assertion, but this need not be represented since it is trivially reconstructed.
Resources are formally irrelevant to Rescher, so d = 0 and for all i, r i = <>. These functions do not appear to restrict protocols much, but note that already a choice has been made regarding non-determinism. In multi-party (more that twoparty) protocols, the order of participation is pre-determined since party.to.move is a function. Non-determinism can be simulated, though, by parties choosing to make empty locutions non-deterministically.
When there is a resource bound but these protocol functions are insensitive to that bound, the bound is unannounced (or hidden) and \time expires" without warning.
These functions serve essentially the same roles as \rules for dialogue," \rules for commitment," and \rules for termination" in logics of dialogue. Mackenzie's dialogues, for example, are formalized by ignoring resources, taking disputation records to be locution records, and writing constraints on locution records that de ne the disputation protocol. We must complicate the model, since our interest in dialogue arises from considerations of search. So we require that protocol can be sensitive to resources consumed within a player's turn, and that players can have information about the search for argument, not just information about the production of argument.
The function, move.options, represents both the locution-obligations and the locution-restrictions. For any member of move.options, which would be a sequence of locutions, obligations quantify existentially over the sequence, while restrictions quantify universally, in their normal forms. For example, a protocol has timed moves just in case, as a restriction, for all m 1 ; m 2 , adjacent in a record of moves, if r 1 is the greatest r i in m 1 and r 2 is the greatest r i in m 2 , jr 2 ? r 1 j k. A protocol restricts moves to a single claim and its argument just in case p i+2 6 = p i , and s i+1 is an argument for s i if s i 2 L. A protocol prohibits repeated arguments just in case < p; s; r 1 > and < p; s; r 2 > do not both appear in a locution record (this restriction makes sense when paired with the restriction that arguments cannot be introduced in locutions if the record already contains an e ective rebuttal). A protocol obligates novel argument instead of rebuttal just in case, for all disputation stages , if party.to.move( ) = pro, and current.opinion( ) 6 = pro, then every member of move.options( ) contains as some locution the (re-)assertion of s 0 , the original claim under dispute.
Most locution-obligations and restrictions are complicated and refer to both the theory of argumentation on which the disputation is based, and the criteria for adjudicatory preferences, as captured in current.opinion. This recognizes that many disputations may end in draws, in which neither party was able to establish the point of contention. Some protocols shift burden in such a way that there is always a winner; in such protocols, being the party.to.move can indicate loss. A protocol is dialectical if at all stages, player.information is the entire disputation record. A protocol is in immediate-response dialectic if it is dialectical and at all stages, party.to.move is not equal to current.opinion.
A strongly alternating two-party immediate response dialectic is one in which, as a restriction, all moves are pairs of locutions: a claim in L and an argument for that claim; and as an obligation, for any = < d; r >; current:opinion( ) 6 = current:opinion( 0 ), where 0 is any stage formed by concatenating a member, m 2 move.options( ) onto the record of moves M(d), forming a new disputation record, and pairing it with r m , the greatest resources in m.
Current opinion is hidden if at some stage, player.information is not su cient to calculate current.opinion; otherwise, current opinion is visible (either because the protocol is dialectical, or because current:opinion can be constructed from a function on a smaller domain).
When search is goal-directed, a player can set a search target. Descriptions of states of search for this goal are not part of the disputation stage, but may be part of computations that players perform in choosing their moves. This is a deliberate choice, with the consequence that change of control can be forced only on the basis of consumed resource, not on how poorly a search is going. If a search space is exhausted, the protocol as de ned here cannot force change of control; however, a cooperative player will make the appropriate locution upon exhausting the space, or set another search target, as appropriate. Since descriptions of intermediate states of players' computations of actions are likely to be as varied as their strategies, the alternative design choice is formally unattractive (at least in the current form, we can restrict the domains if not the ranges of the protocol function). Moreover, for a protocol to be in uenced by the particular way a player chooses a move seems improper, even if that choice makes use of a shared data structure, such as a theoremprover's clause stack.
Four protocols are given next, exhibiting a range of considerations that have been raised in the design of defeasible reasoning systems. Each protocol depends on an underlying conception of argument, which is explained next in brief (see Pollock (1987) , Simari-Loui (1992) , Prakken (1992) , ). The details of argument however, are orthogonal to the issues of protocol.
An argument disagrees with another if the claim of the rst is contrary to what can be derived with the second. An argument counterargues another if it disagrees with some subargument of the other. An argument defeats another if it interferes and is more speci c than the subargument with which it disagrees (speci city is de ned in the next paragraph). If it disagrees without defeat, then it is merely interfering.
All arguments can interfere and support at level 0 . At level n+1 , an argument can support if no argument that can interfere at level n interferes with it. At level n+1 , an argument can interfere if no argument that can interfere at level n defeats it. An argument is ultimately supporting if for some k, it can support at all levels greater than k; likewise, for ultimately interfering.
Rules for speci city are based on the existence of a non-trivial asymmetric activator, along the lines of Poole (1985) .
An asymmetric activator is a contingent sentence that, together with necessary evidence and the combined rules of the theories being compared, allows a consistent and non-trivial defeasible derivation of the conclusion of one argument, but does not do the same for the other argument. Non-triviality requires that all top rules of an argument be used by an asymmetric activator. A rule is top if the antecedents of all other rules in the argument can be derived without using the rule. Separation of contingent from necessary sentences is arbitrary and de nes the background agains which defeasible rules are adopted.
Consistent defeasible derivation is entailment in the underlying logic augmented by (modus ponens for defeasible rules) detachment of defeasible rule consequents when their respective antecedents can be derived. 16 As an example, letting \ >? ? " be an in x symbol for the defeasible reason relation, and letting all and only e i be evidence, consider the arguments:
A Then A 1 and A 2 disagree; A 3 counterargues A 1 at a; A 4 counterargues A 3 at b; and A 4 defeats A 3 , thus reinstating A 1 against A 3 ; note that A 2 is undefeated, so it will remain ultimately interfering with A 1 . At level 0 , all arguments are interfering and supporting. At level 1 , no arguments are supporting, A 1 , A 2 , and A 4 are interfering; at level 2 , A 4 is supporting, and A 1 , A 2 , and A 4 are interfering. All subsequent levels are the same. So A 4 and only A 4 is ultimately supporting. 17 Example One: AND-OR searching for argument. The protocol in Simari-Loui (1992) and in Loui et al. (1993) is a fairly standard approach, where arguments that ground in the (shared) evidence and that change current opinion are required in each move. pro and con take turns introducing complete arguments until time expires or no response can be found. Opinion must switch after each move, and may take on any of three values: pro, con, and none, according to existing rules of support with respect to a possibly incomplete set of arguments. The main choices for players are what should be the targets of search among the various points of counterargument. This protocol generates arguments in much the same way that an and-or search strategy would generate arguments. 17 It is important to note that this k-level determination of support is not the process with which this paper is centrally concerned. Since it is non-trivial to compute, there can be a process that computes it, and that process can be non-ideal. It is, however, the process of disputation, in which this determination of support plays a role, that is central to this paper. The k-level (inductive) determination of support could be integrated into the explicit dialectic with linguistic realization. But that would be a con ation of social computation and computation that supports syntactic determination. current.opinion for the null disputation record is none. Thereafter, current.opinion = pro i s 0 , the main point under dispute, is justi ed among all of the arguments presented, arguments(D) = fs i j < p i ; s i ; r i >2 ?(D)g\ K; . A sentence is justi ed just in case it has an ultimately supporting argument. Also, current.opinion = con i the negation of s 0 is justi ed among all of the arguments presented. Since moves are always two locution (claim and argument for claim), party.to.move can be determined by the length of ?(D). However, play is resource-bounded, so party.to.move = none if r ? r m exceeds < max 1 ; max 2 > in either dimension, where m is the last move in M(D) by the player who is not party.to.move. In a move, all locutions report the same resource; the cumulative search time required to identify an argument that is a su cient response.
At any time, player.information consists of: the entirety of D; r; and a list of targets for which search was unsuccessful in this turn and in past turns. 18 This protocol is a strongly alternating two-party immediate response dialectic. Hence, move.options(D; r) is at any time the set of arguments such that concatenating any one of them onto M(D) causes current.opinion to change. Note that a non-move by the player is to make no locution while resources are exhausted beyond bound. This causes a change in the state of disputation (disputation terminates with current.opinion unchanged), but does not alter the disputation record.
>From our knowledge of defeat and justi cation, we can state move.options(D) more precisely. Case 1. current.opinion = none. party.to.move can introduce a new argument for which there is no interference, for some important claim, or can rebut (by producing a defeating subargument) some argument that alone interferes with some important argument of its own. 19 Let an establishable point be any sentence such that current.opinion would change if party.to.move could make the sentence ultimately justi ed with respect to arguments(D 0 ), where D 0 is the disputation record after the party's move. s 0 is the basic establishable point for pro; its negation is the basic establishable point for con. Let s be any establishable point. Let a be any argument for s and let live.opposition(a) be the subset of arguments(D 0 ) that can ultimately interfere with a. Let targets(a) = ft i g be any set of sentences such that for each a member of live.opposition(a), an argument o 2live.opposition(a), there is in targets(a) some t i that is contrary to some point derivable from o; i.e., the weakest targets(a) collects for each argument in live.opposition(a) a disjunction of negations of interesting subpoints: defeasible rule antecedents or consequents are interesting subpoints. Then the conjunction of members of targets(a) is also an establishable point for party.to.move.
Finally, consider any establishable point paired with an argument for the establishable point, where that argument is legitimate, i.e., a member of K; , and that has no interferer in arguments(D) that can ultimately interfere; this pair will be a member of move.options. Case 2. current.opinion = opposing.party; which is pro if party.to.move is con, 18 But since success is de ned by nding an argument that can a ect current.opinion, and since the last move by opposing player a ects this, nothing may depend on knowing all previous failures. 19 Note that since moves contain a single argument, this protocol thus precludes a move by a party to rebut all arguments, if there are more than one, by producing multiple arguments. However, a single argument for the conjunction of several points, if it has the right structure, can have the same e ect. as a running total for pro and a running total for con. In this example, pro backs away from the rst argument after con successfully responds. Fortunately for pro, there is a separate argument for h. and vice versa. party.to.move can make any of the moves available in Case 1, and can also introduce a new argument for which there is no defeat, for some important claim, or can rebut (by producing an interfering subargument) some argument that alone ultimately justi es some important point of opposing.party. s 0 is the basic su cient point for pro; its negation is the basic su cient point for con. For s a su cient point for party:to:move and a an argument for s, the subset of arguments(D) each of which can ultimately defeat a is established.opposition(a).
targets(a) is as before, some set that includes at least one member contrary to some point derivable in each argument in established.opposition(a). Then the conjunction of members of such a set is also a su cient point for party.to.move.
Consider any su cient point paired with an argument for the point, where that argument is legitimate, i.e., a member of K; and that has no defeater in arguments(D) that can ultimately defeat; this pair will be a member of move.options, as will any pair constructed as above, with an establishable point.
For example, let all e i be (shared) evidence; the following depicts each player's two-locution move: claim or argument for claim, and a running total of resources consumed: Loui-Chen (1992) for the same conception of argument, support, and defeat. In the last protocol, dialectical control is exerted every time an argument is introduced. Here, dialectic occurs every time a potentially adequate backward chaining step is taken while arguments are being constructed. This protocol is close to the computation currently performed in a quasi-legal reasoner that (among other things) peruses decision in cases (precedents) to nd relevant rules for argument. It is an interesting protocol because it allows dialectic to guide search. Instead of allowing backward chaining to nish, a weak step may be questioned immediately by beginning the search for counterargument. The choices for players not only include targets for search, but also whether to continue even after a promising reason has been found (or else stop and allow control to pass to the opponent), and whether to allow the opponent to continue (or else to start counterarguing immediately).
There are complications for assigning burdens, but we may assume that pro carries the burden-to-establish, the burden-to-open, and the burden-to-reinstate-withdefeat.
If resources are not exceeded, current.opinion is always pro if player.to.move is con; current.opinion = none if player.to.move = pro. con's only objective is to thwart pro in this game. Moves are not limited to two locutions, as in the last protocol, so control is not rigidly limited by counting locutions. In fact, players can elect to make as many or as few locutions as they choose, subject to a restriction regarding resources, and an obligation that requires su ciency of response. As before, the resource part of a locution reports the amount of computation the player has spent. This part of the move is not elective; it cannot be omitted or altered by choice.
The resource restriction is simple: at no time can pro's consumption exceed con's by more than some constant k. This is also a termination condition: when player.to.move = pro and any locution that pro could make would violate this resource restriction, the dispute ceases with pro failing to establish the main point, and current.opinion switches to none. If player.to.move = con when resources bind, current.opinion switches to pro.
Su cient response is more interesting. Informally, instead of requiring whole arguments grounded in evidence to be produced in each move, only one reason need be given (although more reasons are permitted). This reason must eventually take part in an argument, grounded in evidence, that helps support the main point of contention. However, completion of the argument is not required; it su ces that this merely be possible, given what reasons have so far been introduced, and given knowledge about possible completions (this is a promissory note for future search). If a player chooses not to complete an argument, but merely to cite its possibility, then the opposing player may immediately investigate possible lines of counterargument, without even waiting for completion of the argument. The opponent could also challenge, asking that the partial argument be brought closer to completion (or challenge all the way to completion) before responding. However, there are implications regarding the accounting of resources when there is search in response to a challenge.
The shared basis includes evidence K, and reasons, , as before. The language, L is a restricted propositional language with negation only for literals and with only the 2-connective for conjunction (no disjunction or conditional). The main point of contention is h.
The sentence of a locution is either a reason, 2 ; or a challenge of an antecedent of some reason, e.g., \challenge p" for the reason p >? ? q. If there is a challenge, then it ends a move. player.information(D; r) consists of the disputation record D, and r, together with all rules so far inspected by either player, and the consequents of the rules that remain uninspected. In response to a challenge, the challenged player has resources k 0 in which to nd a su cient response. If successful, the search is conducted for free and its time is not added to cumulative search time. If unsuccessful with the bounded resource, not only is a response to the challenge still required, but the entire search time, including the k 0 , is charged to the responding player.
The de nition of move.options is completed by giving a precise rule for su cient response. After any move by pro, pro must be capable of engaging in dialogue establishing h; after any move by con, con must be able to prevent pro from engaging in such dialogue. This dialogue could be part of the disputation record, but we exclude it for simplicity. The e ect of such dialogue, however, is important. Let said.reasons be the set of reasons thus far introduced by either player, i.e., \fs i j < p i ; s i ; r i >2 ?g. pro must be able to show that h is live.
A literal is live for a player if (a) it is evidence; or (b) it is a literal for which there is no reason in said.reasons for its negation, and for which there are no challenges in this move; or (c) a tree of potential argument can be cited for the literal which is undefeated for the player.
A tree of potential argument for a literal (henceforth, an argument) is a collection of reasons that can be organized into a tree by: (i) taking the literal to be root; (ii) taking the antecedents of the unique reason for this literal to be its children; (iii) checking that no literal appears with its negation in this tree; (iv) checking that the leaves of the tree are each live. An argument is undefeated for the player if the negation of a literal in the tree cannot be cited to have potential argument for the opposing player where the argument has appropriate strength.
A argument has appropriate strength against its counterargument if: (a) the argument in question is for con, and this argument for con is not less speci c than the argument for pro; or (b) the argument in question is for pro and this argument for pro is more speci c than the argument for con.
Speci city depends on activation: an argument for a literal is activated by a set of literals if the set of literals contains a cutset (not including the root) of the argument. An argument is more speci c than another if there is a set of literal that can be cited that activates the lesser argument, but does not activate the greater argument.
In addition to termination because pro has used too much resource, natural termination occurs when player.to.move can make no su cient response.
For example, let a i be literals that are consequents of reasons and e i be evidence. k = 15; k 0 = 5. h is a 0 . Literals in antecedents of defeasible rules are assumed conjoined. : : : and so on.
Since challenges do not expend the resources of the challenger, the apparently winning player can always be forced to ground in evidence the arguments on which he eventually relies, through challenges by the opposing player.
Example Three: Bundling Claims. This is the third protocol that is based on the same conception of argument, support, and defeat. This protocol was invented to study strategic aspects of disputation. Like the rst protocol, this one requires that an argument, if given, be a complete argument grounded in evidence K. Unlike that protocol, more than one claim can be made in a single move, and not all claims need be made with argument; in fact, only a single argument is allowed in a move, though the number of claims is unrestricted (claims must be relevant). Like the second protocol, the opponent can challenge claims for which arguments are not complete (in this protocol, because they are not given; in the last protocol, because they are not grounded in evidence).
When a claim is made, it is bundled with the other claims in that move. As any claim is won or lost, so too are all of the other claims bundled with it that have not yet been argued. As claims are won and lost in this manner, points are awarded. A lopsided score can cause early termination. This models the rhetorical maneuver that is often made: \I reject a, b, and c; but even granting all of them, rejecting d su ces, and here is my argument for :d." This is a posturing which attempts to focus debate on d, presumably because of limited time, and asks that :a, :b, and :c be conceded with :d, if indeed :d can be established. The opposition can accept the challenge to focus on d, or can instead focus on a, b, or c. Doing any of the latter, and establishing for example a, would be damaging to the player who postured.
Why would a player attempt such a maneuver when rejection of d su ces, and when rejection of a, b, and c could be attempted at a later time if needed? Because no matter which of a, b, c, or d is the focus of dispute, victory on any one is dramatic if the opponent chose the focus of the dispute. Presumably this a ects adjudication, or in our case, can force premature termination. The potential costs for such a move are that the opposing player can choose where now to focus the dialogue. So this protocol allows risky moves to be made by a player. current.opinion is pro or con and starts at con. 20 player.to.move begins pro and switches between pro and con as each meets the obligation of changing current.opinion, or otherwise meets locution obligations. If resources have not expired nor early termination occurred, current.opinion(D) = pro if a distinguished sentence, s 0 , the main point of the dispute, is justi ed with respect to arguments(D). Otherwise, it is con. player:information includes the entire disputation record together with the current:score, which is detailed below. Players also have available information about relative implausibility or vulnerability of various claims, which players might want to use to inform their strategic choices.
Locution sequences include claims and arguments for claims, as in the rst protocol, and also include challenges, as in the second protocol. Unlike the rst protocol, where a claim had to be paired with an argument for the claim, claims need not appear with arguments for them. A move is restricted to at most one argument, its claim, and a number of additional claims, so long as each claim is new and relevant.
To A claim is relevant if, were it to be established (i.e., were there to be an ultimately supporting argument for it, which in this system is equivalent to supposing that the claim in question were undisputed), current.opinion or current.opinion.on(s) for any s would change. This condition can also be stated in terms of su cient responses since we have already xed the rules for defeat and justi cation; however, we will not restate this condition here.
As 3) m contains just a challenge to an initially unargued claim made by the opposing player; or 4) current.opinion favors p and m contains the single locution, with a null sentence, which is interpreted as a pass (this can be used to shift the burden to go forward; when an initially unargued claim has been lost by p, but current.opinion still favors p).
Unlike MacKenzie dialogue games, failure to challenge an unargued claim is not concession of the claim. Unchallenged, initially unargued claims contribute to early termination. They are bundled with the other claims in the move in which they occur, and under certain conditions, these bundles may have value.
Let s be an initially unargued claim made by p in a move m that contained n new claims. The value of s is n. At any disputation stage, the current:score for p is obtained by summing the value of s for every challenged, initially unargued claim s for which current.opinion.on(s) = p. By design choice, unchallenged initially unargued claims do not contribute directly to score. Also, claims bundled together in a single move can each contribute directly to score if challenged and supported, and they may not even contribute to the same player's score. Finally, score draws from claims that may have been made in response to arguments upon which a player no longer even relies, again, by design choice (mostly for simplicity).
Termination occurs when a player is unable to make a legitimate move within acceptable resource limits, or when current.opinion favors p and current:score is lopsided in favor of p. Lopsidedness, like resource limitation, is determined by prag- Figure 8 . One way a dispute can begin under the third protocol. pro must actually do something since current.opinion begins con and will not switch until an ultimately supporting argument is given. matics. Figures 8{13 demonstrate di erent ways a disputation can begin under this protocol. Figure 10 . This is the normal way that an argument begins under the third protocol. Figure 11 . Finally, a dialogue that makes use of an unargued claim. pro responds to con by defeating con's argument, thus reinstating the rst argument. pro ignores con's unargued claim, :b, choosing to retain the current focus of dispute and not to challenge con to justify :b. But if the unargued claim is particularly weak in pro's estimation, pro should challenge it. con must think :b to be strong in order to risk bundling the claim in this way. Example Four: Players Responsible for Meta-Arguments. Finally, a protocol may require defeat relations between arguments to be argued by the parties.
The locutions of the two parties thus include meta-claims and meta-arguments in addition to claims and arguments. All object-level arguments are named when introduced. Meta-claims about the arguments use these argument names. Metaclaims are supported by meta-arguments of a special kind so that these is no regress to meta-meta-claims about meta-arguments. The meta-claims are either (a) that an Here, con postures twice. The rst time, pro retains the focus and chooses not to challenge, responding instead with a reinstating argument. The second time con postures, pro challenges and wins (at least for the moment). current.opinion still is con because pro cannot support a. So upon losing the challenge, con shifts the burden to go forward and pro must still try to support h. argument defeats another or (b) that it is undefeated by another, therefore free to interfere, unless some other argument defeats it. Meta-claims concern asymmetric activation, which is important under the current conception of defeat; but this is just an example: a di erent conception of defeat among arguments would suggest di erent kinds of meta-claims.
Requiring parties to supply their own arguments for defeat is useful since the test for speci city can be computationally expensive. Technically, the computation requires determining non-activation of one theory as well as activation of another. Determination of asymmetric activation can be made a part of the dialogue.
Locutions may contain a single object-level claim, always paired with an argument for the claim, which is named. A claim always occurs with a meta-claim, which essentially claims that this object-level claim is an adequate response, unless it is the rst argument for the main point of the dispute, s 0 , in which case the adequacy is clear. Meta-claims can sometimes be made without object-level claims. Meta-claims always occur with meta-arguments for the meta-claim. For simplicity, assume that the most recent meta-claim among those that con ict is always the best among them. That this makes sense here because entailment claims are assumed to be correct when made, but claims of non-entailment can be in error because they are the result of negation-as-failure proof attempts. Meta-arguments about asymmetric activation consist of an entailment claim and a non-entailment claim. A sequence of disagreeing meta-claims occurs, for example, when: rst, an argument A 1 is claimed to bear no speci city relation to another A 2 , because there are no asymmetric activators discovered for either; then, one party claims to nd an asymmetric activator, a sentence that activates A 1 , but does not appear to activate A 2 ; then, the opposing party nds the entailment relation that had been overlooked, so the putative asymmetric activator is actually a symmetric activator, activating both arguments; then, another asymmetric activator is claimed to be found, and so forth.
current.opinion is determined by following the inductive labeling scheme that determines which arguments are ultimately supporting. There is however a restriction: the defeat relations that are recognized during labeling are only those that have been claimed in the disputation record. In fact, only the best defeat claims, the latest among disagreeing defeat claims (actually meta-claims) are recognized. current.opinion begins con, with player.to.move=pro, then both alternate as a su cient response is made, that is, as moves are taken from move.options.
move.options consists of appropriately resource-restricted locutions that would alter current.opinion. current.opinion = pro just in case there is ultimate support for s 0 relative to the recognized defeat relations among the mentioned arguments.
Note that a su cient response can consist of either a claim, argument, meta-claim, and meta-argument, or just the latter pair. Termination occurs, as before, through resource expenditure, or movement into a winning position, where there are no move.options for player.to.move. An example is contained in gure 14.
PROSPECTS
Disputation is a complex thing. The formal theory of rational belief for demonstrative argument, mathematical logic, is not simple, nor particularly elegant, despite the beauty beheld by some. Still, the pre-formal and semi-formal investigations here have unsatisfying complexity and point in unsettling directions. We must be certain that the complexity and compass are unavoidable.
We begin with the assumption that there are claims, and there are reasons relating one claim to another. When the reasons are policies for constructing arguments, and this is most of the time, the constructions are non-demonstrative because policies can con ict. Constructivism and resource limitation require us to acknowledge the non-determinism of outcome and non-monotonicity in the computation of outcome. Hence, there may be only weak guarantees about how the outcome of the process may be regarded as \correct." Yet we must avoid protocols too simple to produce what Figure 14 . One way a dispute can begin under the fourth protocol. The issue is whether A3 defeats A2. This depends on the existence of an activator for A2 that does not activate A3, and the non-existence of an activator for A3 that does not activate A2. pro fails (perhaps deliberately) to notice that c entails e3^d, so that there appears to be an asymmetry of activation. However, con breaks the illusion of asymmetry by announcing the required entailment relation.
we would regard as rational belief. Fair and e ective protocols are desired. Crap shoots are disdained. Under a protocol, choice may be unavoidable, and choice can often be attributed to a party. Choice raises the question of whether some choices are better than others, and the question of how to exclude choices that do not further rational inquiry.
We begin wanting only to compute entailments for a database in what seemed to be and what experience tells us is a convenient language. The linguistic arti ce of non-demonstrative inference merely re ects the non-demonstrative reasoning that we use; this must be the explanation of why such language is convenient. Its convenience belies its historical resistance to formalization.
We begin looking for a calculus for non-demonstrative entailments. We end xated on the design of formal games. The games' rules depend on a conception of an argument's defeat and of a claim's support. The particular rules are too new to have had proper critical appraisal. Guidance on the selection of an appropriate game does not presently exist. Further, we can expect even the best future guidance to be indeterminate, permitting many possibilities. This expectation is the result of both negative experience with a priori justi cation of demonstrative systems, and experience with protocols for disputation in the world.
In fact, this investigation merely begins the formal invention and analysis of protocols. Important possibilities remain unexplored. Adjudicators intervene. Protocol is negotiated. Real adjudicators attend to pragmatics, to the rami cations of their decisions, to utilities and disutilities. Whether they ought to do this, whether doing so jeopardizes stare decisis or some other principle dearly held, is within the scope of an investigation of this kind of logic. This is broad work not for the timid.
History provides a mandate and arti cial intelligence provides a need. Aristotle cleaved non-demonstrative from demonstrative reasoning. Keynes signaled that a failure to formalize the non-demonstrative in favor of the demonstrative would run us afoul. Pollock, Simon, Rescher, and Doyle have pointed to where formalism can today be found. Whether adequate, cogent, formal tools can be developed, or at least how quickly, seems now to be a matter of e ort. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that much of the work is done.
